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1. INTRODUCTION
Different languages organise reference to the future in different ways. Many languages
require speakers to use a distinct verb form when talking about future events (inflectional
future tense). Other languages do not distinguish as clearly between future and present
events, and speakers can talk about the future in much the same way in which they talk
about the present (no inflectional future tense).1 This difference extends to religious dis-
course, e.g. scriptures, prayers, etc.2 Does this grammatical contrast have implications for
speakers’ religious convictions and behaviour? In this paper, we argue that the answer
is: yes, whether a speaker’s language contains or lacks inflectional future tense has conse-
quences for his/her level of religiosity.
At first, the idea that a mere grammatical difference may matter for cognition and be-
haviour may seem far-fetched. But there is substantial evidence that there is in fact a con-
nection between the language we speak and how we think and act. There are two different
pathways along which linguistic features can be relevant to our behaviour. First, linguistic
features are often a manifestation of deeper cultural traits. For instance, in Japanese there
are numerous second-person pronouns, marking varying levels of politeness. Here, lan-
guage is a reflection of a culture characterised by high levels of social hierarchy (Kashima
and Kashima, 1998). Second, linguistic features can have a direct effect on cognition and
behaviour. This claim is commonly known as the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis or Whorfism
(see e.g. Lucy, 1997; Casasanto, 2015). For example, Russian forces its speakers to distin-
guish between light and dark blue, as it lacks a generic term corresponding to the English
“blue”. This lexical difference influences speakers’ cognition; Winawer et al. (2007) have
shown that Russian speakers are better at discriminating different shades of blue. Finally,
there may be a complex interplay between the cultural and the cognitive pathway—e.g. cer-
tain cultural traits may first become embodied in language, their linguistic manifestation
1 See Section 2 for a more detailed explanation of the two different future tense systems.
2 For instance, the following famous passage from the Second Epistle to Timothy is in inflectional future
tense in the French bible (1.), whereas the Finnish bible lacks inflectional future tense (2.).
‘And the Lord will rescue me from every evil attack and will bring me safely to his heavenly
kingdom.’ (2 Timothy 4:18)
1. Le Seigneur me délivrera de toute oeuvre mauvaise, et il me sauvera pour me faire entrer dans
son royaume céleste
And the Lord me deliverfuture of all works evil, and he me savefuture to me make enter
into his kingdom heavenly.
2. Ja Herra on vapahtava minut kaikesta ilkivallasta ja pelastava minut taivaalliseen valtakun-
taansa
And the Lord is freeingpresent me from all wickedness, and savespresent me in his heav-
enly kingdom.
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may then contribute to spreading, amplifying, or preserving these traits (Mavisakalyan and
Weber, 2017).
How do the two channels of influence relate to the case of future tense and religiosity? In
a nutshell, the connection is the following. First, speaking a language that lacks inflectional
future tense, such as Finnish or German, is associated with higher long-term orientation,
reflected in lower time discount rates, i.e. speakers of languages without inflectional future
tense tend to discount future costs and rewards less than users of inflectional future tense
(Galor et al., 2016). Second, by talking about the future as if it were the present, speak-
ers of languages without inflectional future tense subjectively perceive future outcomes as
temporally less distant (Chen, 2013). Both factors matter for speakers’ religiosity, since the
appeal of being religious depends to a large extent on the promise of a vast future pay-off
for the faithful: an afterlife in heaven. Speakers of languages without inflectional future tense,
we propose, value this future good more highly and locate it closer to their own temporal
position than do users of inflectional future tense. As a result, they are more likely to be
religious.
Based on data from a collection of nationally-representative surveys from 83 countries, we
show that there is a positive and significant association between speaking a language that
lacks inflectional future tense and the probability of being religious. Relative to individuals
who use inflectional future tense, absence of inflectional future tense is associated with a 6.4
percentage points increase in the probability of being religious in the most extensive model
specification. In addition to individual characteristics, our analysis controls for wave, coun-
try, language family and ethnicity fixed effects thereby mitigating the potential confounding
effects of geography, culture, history, institutions, and socio-economic conditions. Moreover,
we show that speakers of languages without inflectional future tense derive more comfort
from being religious and have a higher propensity to accept the costs associated with being
religious, such as attending religious services, praying and complying with religious norms.
The link between language, culture and behaviour is the focus of a growing literature in
economics (for reviews see Mavisakalyan and Weber, 2017; Ginsburgh and Weber, 2020).
Three linguistic features have received particular attention. First, the literature has estab-
lished a connection between personal pronoun systems and various cultural traits such as
individualism, collectivism and social distance (Kashima and Kashima, 1998; Licht et al.,
2007; Tabellini, 2008; Davis and Abdurazokzoda, 2016; Davis and Williamson, 2016). Sec-
ond, it has demonstrated that linguistic gender systems affect gender inequalities in a num-
ber of domains including labour markets (Mavisakalyan, 2015; van der Velde et al., 2015;
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Gay et al., 2017), corporate and political leadership (Santacreu-Vasut et al., 2014; Hicks et al.,
2016; Jeny and Santacreu-Vasut, 2017), household division of labour (Hicks et al., 2015) and
education (Davis and Reynolds, 2018; Galor et al., 2020). Third, and directly relevant to
our study, the literature has shown that absence of inflectional future tense affects speakers’
inter-temporal preferences (Sutter et al., 2018) and induces more future-oriented behaviours
including higher saving (Chen, 2013; Guin, 2015), higher investment in health (Chen, 2013)
and education (Galor et al., 2020), higher propensity to become entrepreneurs (Campo et al.,
2020), and raised environmental concern and action (Mavisakalyan et al., 2018) at the level
of individuals and/or countries. At the corporate level, lack of inflectional future tense is
associated with higher precautionary cash holdings (Chen et al., 2017), higher investment in
research and development (Chi et al., 2020), and higher loan spreads and higher collateral
use in loan contracts (Godlewski and Weill, 2019). We extend this literature by considering
a novel outcome: religiosity.
Studies on the economics of religion have shown that religiosity has implications for eco-
nomic behaviours and outcomes (see Iannaccone, 1994, 1998; Lehrer, 2004; Hoffmann, 2013;
Iyer, 2016, for reviews). Religious and non-religious individuals are different from each
other in a number of important ways, including how much they work (e.g. Spenkuch, 2017)
and study (e.g. Mohanty, 2016), pre-disposition to risky behaviours (e.g. Fletcher and Ku-
mar, 2014), fertility (e.g. Hayford and Morgan, 2008), health (e.g. Maselko and Kubzansky,
2006), happiness (e.g. Lelkes, 2006), economic and political preferences (e.g. Scheve et al.,
2006; Renneboog and Spaenjers, 2011). At the macro level, there is evidence linking re-
ligion with economic growth (e.g. Barro and McCleary, 2003; McCleary and Barro, 2006).
What are the sources of differences in religiosity? The literature has identified important
determinants of differences in religiosity including income (Becker and Woessmann, 2013;
Buser, 2015) and education (Cesur and Mocan, 2013; Hungerman, 2014). Adverse life events
such as natural disasters (Sinding Bentzen, 2019), rainfall risk (Ager and Ciccone, 2017), un-
employment and marital separation (Clark and Lelkes, 2006), financial crisis (Chen, 2010),
shocks to income (Dehejia et al., 2007) and to social mobility (Binzel and Carvalho, 2017) also
influence religious beliefs. The main idea behind some of these findings is that of social in-
surance existing on the basis of religious obligation (e.g. Dehejia et al., 2007) or of ‘religious
coping’ whereby individuals are better at dealing with challenging situations by drawing on
religious beliefs (e.g. Sinding Bentzen, 2019). Our study adds to this literature by offering a
novel explanation for differences in religiosity.
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In the next section, we discuss the potential mechanisms which mediate the effect of lan-
guage on religiosity. Section 3 presents our data and empirical approach. Section 4 presents
the results. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings in Section 5.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1. Future tense. Languages differ in how they encode reference to the future. Following
Dahl and Velupillai (2013), we categorise languages into two groups: languages that require
speakers to use a designated verb form when talking about the future; these are languages
with inflectional future-tense. Other languages lack inflectional future tense; these languages
either do not mark the future at all, or do so by other means, for instance, with the help
of a present-tensed auxiliary verb.3 For instance, when talking about tomorrow’s weather,
speakers of a language without inflectional future tense, such as Finnish, use the same verb
form in which they speak about today’s weather (Dahl and Velupillai, 2013):
(1) Tänään on kylmää.
today is cold.
‘It is cold today.’
(2) Huomenna on kylmää.
tomorrow is cold.
‘It will be cold tomorrow.’
On the other hand, speakers of French, an inflectional future tense language, use a dedicated
future verb form when expressing the same information:
(1) Il fait froid aujourd’hui.
It dopresent cold today.
‘It is cold today.’
(2) Il fera froid demain.
It dofuture cold today.
‘It will be cold tomorrow.’
As pointed out above, linguistic features can affect economic outcomes through at least two
different channels: first, they can have a direct effect on cognition and behaviour; second,
they can serve as indicators of more fundamental cultural factors. Both the cognitive and
the cultural channel of influence seem operative in the case of future tense. We will further
3 Our classification of languages is in line with that of Galor et al. (2016, 2020). However, unlike Galor et al.
we stick to the original terminology of Dahl and Velupillai (2013) and speak of languages with “no inflectional
future tense”, rather than languages with “periphrastic future tense”. The reason is that the term “periphrastic
future tense” commonly refers to languages, such as English, which mark the future with an auxiliary (e.g.
will), and not to languages that do not require any future tense marking at all, such as Finnish.
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elaborate on both points. For an extensive discussion of the problem of causality in this
domain see Mavisakalyan and Weber (2017); Ginsburgh and Weber (2020).
First, as Chen (2013, §2) has suggested, lack of inflectional future tense may lead speakers
“to perceive future events as less distant” (Chen, 2013, p. 695). Since languages without in-
flectional future tense do not distinguish future from present events as sharply, they locate
future events subjectively closer to the agent’s own temporal position. Absence of inflec-
tional future tense decreases, while presence of inflectional future tense increases subjective
temporal distance. Why does the perceived temporal distance of an outcome matter for de-
cision making? It matters because of the well-known and wide-spread tendency, known as
time discounting (Frederick et al., 2002), to value future rewards or costs less than present
ones—we rather have $100 now than in a year’s time.
This brings us to the second, cultural channel of influence mentioned above. Future tense
is a marker of economically relevant cultural traits. In particular, lack of inflectional future
tense is associated with higher long-term orientation (Galor et al., 2016). Higher long-term
orientation, in turn, is reflected in smaller time discount rates: higher “Long Term Orienta-
tion predict[s] a stronger tendency to wait for larger payoffs” (Wang et al., 2016, p. 116).4
Both channels of influence, the linguistic and the cultural one, work in the same direction—
both predict that speakers of languages without inflectional future tense engage more in fu-
ture directed actions and are more willing to accept short-term costs in return for long-term
rewards. This finding has been corroborated for a whole range of significant economic out-
comes (e.g. Chen, 2013; Guin, 2015; Chen et al., 2017; Mavisakalyan et al., 2018; Godlewski
and Weill, 2019; Chi et al., 2020).
In case language plays an active causal role, can we expect an individual’s level of reli-
giosity to change, if s/he were to acquire a new language? Can we, for instance, expect
that a French speaker (a language with inflectional future tense) ceteris paribus to become
more religious upon becoming fluent in Finnish (a language without inflectional future
tense)? While this may seem surprising, this is indeed what a causal influence of future
tense predicts. In fact, there is growing evidence that such effects within individuals are
real. For instance, Athanasopoulos (2007) finds that with regards to behaviours related to
plural marking, Japanese speakers with an advanced knowledge of English behave more
like monolingual English speakers, while Japanese speakers who have only an intermedi-
ate level of English behave like monolingual speakers of Japanese. For similar behavioural
4 Typically, time discounting is represented by a discounting function involving a discounting factor δ
determined by an agent’s discount rate r. Smaller discount rates result in a discounting factor closer to 1.
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effects of other linguistic features in bilingual individuals see Kousta et al. (2008); Athana-
sopoulos (2009); Kurinski and Sera (2011); for an overview see Athanasopoulos and Aveledo
(2012). There is also evidence on the specific case of future tense and intertemporal choice.
Ayres et al. (2020) show that bilingual individuals that speak both a language without in-
flectional future tense and one with inflectional future tense make different intertemporal
choices depending on the language in which a future-directed task is presented to them:
“[. . . ] participants who are addressed in languages in which the present and the future are
marked more distinctly tend to value future events less than participants who are addressed
in languages in which the present and the future are similarly marked.” (Ayres et al., 2020,
p. 3). In the face of these findings, it does not seem implausible to assume that future tense
may have some level of causal influence on religious behaviour, rather than being a mere
surface phenomenon. That notwithstanding, our analysis will remain neutral between the
two different channels of influence.
2.2. Future tense and religiosity. How do the foregoing points bear on the case of religios-
ity? Our central conjecture is that differences in religiosity between speakers of languages
that contain or lack inflectional future tense can be partially explained by the fact that being
religious has higher expected utility for speakers who do not use inflectional future tense.
As just mentioned, the two groups of speakers differ in their assessment of future-directed
actions. Both the linguistic and the cultural channel lead speakers of a language without
inflectional future tense to assign higher expected utility to actions that promise future re-
wards. Importantly, this applies to an agent’s decision of being religious: here, the relevant
future reward is an afterlife in heaven. We can summarize this point as follows:
HYPOTHESIS: Being religious has a higher expected utility for speakers of a lan-
guage without inflectional future tense compared to similar speakers of a language
with inflectional future tense.
Before considering the expected costs and benefits that determine an agent’s choice, we want
to address a general concern with the present approach. One might worry that it is artificial
to conceptualise religiosity as a conscious choice. However, we are not alone here—the
decision-theoretic approach to religiosity has a long history, reaching back at least to Pascal
(1670). It is furthermore important to note that we are comparing individuals within a given
religious denomination. Our approach is therefore compatible with treating having a certain
religious denomination as a cultural trait, outside of individuals’ conscious decisions. The
main outcome of interest is whether or not an individual gives an affirmative answer to the
question of whether they are a religious person. We take this to capture whether or not they
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actively embrace the religious denomination they may find themselves with. Furthermore,
our analysis extends to intentional actions, such as the frequency of praying and attending
religious ceremonies. Both can naturally be understood as resulting from deliberate choices.
Let us take a closer look at the relevant decision matrix. The basic choice an agent faces
is between Being Religious and Not Being Religious. By Being Religious we are referring to
the option of endorsing a religion which is available in the agent’s context. By Not Being
Religious we are referring to the option of not endorsing any of the contextually available
religions. It is helpful to distinguish between short-term costs and benefits and long-term costs
and benefits associated with being religious. Being religious involves more than merely ac-
cepting a certain set of religious doctrines on a cognitive level. It has significant practical
consequences, many of which incur short-term costs. For instance, active members of a re-
ligion typically engage in certain rituals, such as prayers and religious ceremonies. More
importantly, religions impose demanding behavioural norms on their followers. Most re-
ligious codes prohibit theft, abortion, homosexuality, prostitution, etc. These norms often
conflict with agents’ narrow and short-term self-interests. On the other hand, there are also
short-term benefits associated with being religious. Many believers derive psychological
comfort from being religious, which may e.g. help mitigate the fear of death and the distress
caused by the realization that human existence is finite.
With regards to the amount of negative utility associated with Being Religious, it seems
plausible that both groups of speakers will have to bear the same short-term costs, such
as complying with a religious code, sacrificing time and other resources to attend religious
ceremonies, etc. However, there may be certain differences in short-term benefits that dis-
tinguish users of a language without inflectional future tense from users of a language with
inflectional future tense. As pointed out above, the former have on average a higher con-
cern for the future. As a result, they may dread death more and may derive a higher level
of psychological discomfort from the thought that their existence is finite. In turn, they may
receive a higher psychological pay-off from the belief that a positive afterlife awaits them.
If being religious incurs significant short-term costs, often outweighing their short-term
benefits, why might rational agents nevertheless decide to be religious? The crucial factor
which mitigates these short-term costs is a highly appealing long-term benefit: a rewarding
future afterlife in heaven. But there is also a potential long-term cost: most religions also
contain the threat of a negative or hellish afterlife for those who do not comply with the
respective religious norms. Importantly, the long-term benefit and the long-term cost do not
simply cancel each other out. According to most theologies, one can minimise the risk of
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incurring the long-term costs by not sinning. And indeed, most people expect that they will
go to heaven rather than to hell (YouGov, 2015). Hence, Being religious can have an overall
positive expected utility for the faithful.
Granting that the expected pay-off of Being religious significantly depends on the perceived
long-term benefit of heaven and the perceived long-term cost of hell (and that the former of-
ten outweighs the latter), the above assumptions predict two significant differences between
speakers of languages without inflectional future tense vs speakers of languages with inflec-
tional future tense. First, speakers of languages without inflectional future tense value the
good of a positive afterlife higher and perceive it as temporally closer. Second, they also
assess the disvalue of a negative afterlife higher and again perceive it as more proximate. As
a result, they are more likely to bear the associated short-term costs of being religious, such
as engaging in religious practices. They also have a stronger reason to comply with the rele-
vant religious norms and can therefore be expected to judge transgressions more harshly. In
the next section, we explore these predictions empirically.
3. EMPIRICAL APPROACH
3.1. Baseline model. Our estimation framework exploits variations in grammar of the lan-
guages spoken by similar individuals within the same country in order to identify the effects
of future tense. To test our central hypothesis, we consider a basic model in which propen-
sity for being religious, Religious∗ict for an individual i in country c at time t, is assumed to
depend on the absence of inflectional future tense NoIn f lectFTict in the language spoken
by the individual, together with (1) series of individual characteristics Xict which might af-
fect their choice of being religious (these include standard demographic and socio-economic
characteristics, as well as the religion available in the individual’s context); and (2) country
and wave-of-interview fixed effects Kc and Wt to account for confounding effects of geogra-
phy, institutions, and socio-economic conditions. Unobserved factors εict further contribute
to the propensity for being religious, leading to an equation of the form:
Religious∗ict = βNoIn f lectFTict + Xict
′δ + Kc′γ + Wt′ψ + εict (1)
Observed religiosity status Religiousict is assumed to relate to latent propensity through the
criterion Religiousict = 1(Religious∗ict ≥ 0), so that the probability of being religious under
an assumption of normality for εict becomes:
Pr(Religiousict = 1|NoIn f lectFTict, Xict, Kc, Wt) =
= Φ(βNoIn f lectFTict + Xict
′δ + Kc′γ + Wt′ψ) (2)
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with marginal effects of language future tense derived from the estimated model thus:
∂Pr(Religiousict = 1|NoIn f lectFTict, Xict, Kc, Wt)
∂NoIn f lectFTict
=
= βφ(βNoIn f lectFTict + Xict
′δ + Kc′γ + Wt′ψ) (3)
While this estimation approach allows us to isolate the effects of language from those of
socio-economic conditions, institutions and geography, it still has two potential problems.
First, the languages used to study the link between future tense and religiosity may not
be independent given the geographical and historical relatedness of languages. As Roberts
et al. (2015) argue, this is particularly a problem with cultural traits since ‘languages and cul-
tures inherit traits from common historical ancestors and borrow traits from neighbouring
cultures’ (p. 2). So it is possible that we observe the same traits in two cultures because they
inherited them from the same ancestor culture, rather than because of causal dependencies
between the traits. To account for cultural relatedness, we follow Roberts et al. (2015) to in-
troduce controls for language families, since grouping languages in the same family signifies
that they have evolved from a common ancestor, a proto-language.
Second, although the proposed approach accounts for many significant factors that may
affect individual’s behaviour— socio-economic conditions, institutions, and the broader cul-
tural context—the effect of future tense may still reflect additional cultural effects due to the
ethnic ancestry of the individual. To mitigate this possibility, we additionally include eth-
nicity fixed effects in a robustness check. This approach effectively exploits variations in
structures of the languages spoken by individuals with the same ethnicity to identify the
effect of language future tense. As we have stressed throughout, our empirical approach
explicitly allows for future tense to work either through a linguistic-cognitive or a cultural
channel, without disentangling them.
In addition to studying the link between the lack of inflectional future tense and religiosity,
we (1) assess the validity of the assumptions underlying this relationship; and (2) implica-
tions for taking up costs associated with religiosity. To tackle (1), we explore whether the
effectiveness of the incentives and disincentives associated with religion varies depending
on the presence of inflectional future tense in an individual’s language. Exploring (2) leads
us to look at the implications of the lack of inflectional future tense for taking up costs as-
sociated with religiosity: involvement in religious practices and compliance with religious
norms. We provide the details on our approach to these issues in an extended analysis which
we present in §4.2.
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Figure 1: Global distribution of speakers of languages that lack inflectional future tense
Note.— NO INFLECTIONAL FT is a binary variable for absence of inflectional future tense in an individual’s
language. It is averaged over all individuals surveyed in the World Values Survey in a country. Lighter
shades indicate higher shares of NO INFLECTIONAL FT language speakers in a country. Countries not in the
sample are in white.
3.2. Data. Our analysis is based on the World Values Surveys (WVS), a collection of nationally-
representative individual-level repeated cross-sectional surveys conducted in nearly 100
countries which contain almost 90% of the world’s population. The survey has started
in 1981–1984 and contains rich information on the beliefs (including religious beliefs) and
values of people throughout the world, alongside standard background demographic and
socio-economic characteristics. Since wave 3, conducted in 1995–1998, the surveys include
information on the language spoken at home by the individual, which makes it possible to
link the observed behaviour of individuals in the surveys to the future tense system in their
language. We thus utilise the four waves of WVS conducted in 1994–1998 (wave 3), 1999–
2004 (wave 4), 2005–2009 (wave 5) and 2010–2014 (wave 6) which jointly include information
on 310,388 individuals interviewed in 100 countries.
The operational sample used in the baseline analysis, however, is limited to 148,847 indi-
viduals in 83 countries. This is due to two key factors. First, data on grammatical structure
for some of the languages spoken by individuals in WVS is missing. Data on the grammat-
ical marking of future tense in languages, as defined in §2.1, comes from the World Atlas of
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Definition of Variable Mean
RELIGIOUS 0-1 binary variable; equals 1 if 0.695
respondent is ’a religious person’ (0.461)
NO INFLECTIONAL FT 0-1 binary variable; equals 1 if 0.509
respondent’s language lacks (0.500)
inflectional future tense
DENOMINATIONS:
CHRISTIAN 0-1 binary variable; equals 1 if 0.489
respondent has Christian denomination (0.500)
MUSLIM 0-1 binary variable; equals 1 if 0.244
respondent has Muslim denomination (0.430)
JEWISH 0-1 binary variable; equals 1 if 0.005
respondent has Jewish denomination (0.070)
HINDU 0-1 binary variable; equals 1 if 0.023
respondent has Hindu denomination (0.150)
EAST ASIAN 0-1 binary variable; equals 1 if 0.043
respondent has Buddhist or other (0.205)
East Asian religious denomination
OTHER 0-1 binary variable; equals 1 if 0.195
respondent has other or no denomination (0.396)
BASELINE CONTROLS:
MALE 0-1 binary variable; equals 1 if 0.485
respondent is male (0.500)
AGE Respondent’s age 41.130
(16.170)
MARRIED 0-1 binary variable; equals 1 if 0.641
respondent is married or cohabiting (0.480)
NO CHILDREN 0-1 binary variable; equals 1 if 0.287
respondent has no children (0.452)
PRIMARY 0-1 binary variable; equals 1 if 0.211
respondent has primary-level education (0.408)
SECONDARY 0-1 binary variable; equals 1 if 0.268
respondent has secondary-level education (0.443)
TERTIARY 0-1 binary variable; equals 1 if 0.522
respondent has tertiary-level education (0.500)
EMPLOYED 0-1 binary variable; equals 1 if 0.526
respondent is employed (0.499)
INCOME GROUP 1 0-1 binary variable denoting 0.203
self-assessed income standing (0.402)
INCOME GROUP 2 0-1 binary variable denoting 0.272
self-assessed income standing (0.445)
INCOME GROUP 3 0-1 binary variable denoting 0.298
self-assessed income standing (0.457)
INCOME GROUP 4 0-1 binary variable denoting 0.166
self-assessed income standing (0.372)
INCOME GROUP 5 0-1 binary variable denoting 0.062
self-assessed income standing (0.241)
Note.— Standard deviations in parentheses. N = 148, 847.
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Language Structures (WALS) Online (Dahl and Velupillai, 2013). The WALS is a large data-
base of linguistic structures compiled by a team of 55 authors and has been the main source
of data on linguistic structures in the literature (Dryer and Haspelmath, 2013). While, on av-
erage, information for around 400 languages is presented for each linguistic feature (infor-
mation on future tense forms is available for 222 languages), this is still less than 10% of the
world’s languages (Comrie et al., 2013). As a result, at times, information on a given linguis-
tic feature in WALS might be available for only a subset of languages spoken by individuals
represented in large survey datasets such as WVS (Mavisakalyan and Weber, 2017). Second,
our identification approach, as discussed in §3.1, exploits the presence of multilingual coun-
tries with sufficient linguistic diversity to allow for within-country comparisons. Hence,
countries lacking such diversity are excluded from the sample.5 Additionally, a small num-
ber of observations with missing values on key variables are dropped. Figure 1 describes
the prevalence and geographic distribution of the structure of future tense in our sample,
highlighting wide variations within countries and regions in the shares of speakers of lan-
guages without inflectional future tense. Across the entire sample, half of the individuals
speak a language that lacks inflectional future tense (Table 1).
We study how NO INFLECTIONAL FT—a dummy for lack of inflectional future tense—
affects religiosity, RELIGIOUS, defined by the response to the question of whether the subject
is a religious person. Nearly 70% of individuals in our estimation sample consider them-
selves religious persons. We examine the decision of embracing a contextually available
religion. To proxy for contextually available religions, we include dummies for religious de-
nominations distinguishing between those whose formal denomination is Christian, Mus-
lim, Jewish, Hindu, East Asian (Buddhist or other East Asian denomination) and others. We
regard denomination as exogenous in our context. Furthermore, we ascertain that it is statis-
tically unrelated to absence of inflectional future tense—Table A1 in the Appendix presents
the results. Nearly half of the individuals in the sample are of Christian denomination.
Muslims constitute nearly quarter of the sample. The rest of the denominations represent
relatively small shares with 4% East Asian, 2% Hindus and 0.5% Jews. The remaining indi-
viduals have either other or no denomination at all.6 Our analysis additionally controls for a
5For example, Italy drops out of the sample since the only language spoken at home reported within the
WVS sample is Italian (alongside ’other’ language which cannot be identified). On the other hand, Germany
remains in the sample due to the presence of individuals speaking a language other than German (e.g. Turkish,
Russian).
6 Splitting this group into two—those with other and those with no denomination—has no implication for
the results.
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range of background characteristics of individuals. These include gender, age, family status,
educational attainment, employment and income. These variables are described in Table 1.
4. RESULTS
4.1. Baseline results. We start by undertaking a probit estimation of religiosity and absence
of inflectional future tense. Table 2 presents the marginal effects from this estimation de-
scribed in equation 3. First, we present a parsimonious specification looking at the relation-
ship between NO INFLECTIONAL FT and RELIGIOUS in a given religion and country context
(column 1). Consistent with our central hypothesis, there is a significant and positive rela-
tionship between absence of inflectional future tense and the probability of being religious.
Additionally, as can be expected, individuals belonging to one of the major religious denom-
inations are more likely to be religious relative to the rest. In column (2) we introduce con-
trols for 13 major language families to account for the relatedness of languages as discussed
in §3.1. The estimated significant positive relationship between NO INFLECTIONAL FT and
RELIGIOUS is robust to this change in specification, and also to introducing additional con-
trols for demographic characteristics of individuals (column 3). According to these results,
males are less likely to be religious. On the other hand, marriage and presence of children
is associated with higher probability of endorsing a religion. As seen in columns (4) and (5),
the estimated relationship between NO INFLECTIONAL FT and RELIGIOUS remains robust
to further controlling for socio-economic characteristics of individuals. Religiosity decreases
with educational attainment, however, controlling for educational attainment, employment
and income status of individuals do not appear to significantly affect religiosity in these re-
sults. When the full set of baseline controls are included (column 5), speaking a language
without inflectional future tense is associated with a 3.7 percentage points increase in the
probability of being religious, in line with our central hypothesis in §2.2.
To identify the relationship between NO INFLECTIONAL FT and RELIGIOUS, we exploit
the presence of multilingual countries with sufficient linguistic diversity to allow for within-
country comparison. In some countries in the sample, however, only a small group of ob-
servations contribute to such diversity. In column (1) of Table 3 we restrict the sample to
individuals belonging to country-language pairs with at least 200 observations. The results
are robust to this change in estimation sample.
Next, in column (2) of Table 3 we consider whether the results might be driven by lan-
guages that are prominent globally: Arabic, English, Russian and Spanish. This results in a
significant reduction in the sample size; still we estimate significant positive marginal effect
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Table 2: Baseline regressions — probit marginal effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: RELIGIOUS
NO INFLECTIONAL FT 0.032* 0.039** 0.035** 0.037** 0.037**
(0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017)
CHRISTIAN 0.440*** 0.440*** 0.423*** 0.422*** 0.422***
(0.027) (0.036) (0.028) (0.025) (0.029)
MUSLIM 0.452*** 0.455*** 0.450*** 0.447*** 0.447***
(0.031) (0.041) (0.032) (0.028) (0.032)
JEWISH 0.249*** 0.249*** 0.234** 0.233** 0.232**
(0.090) (0.090) (0.093) (0.091) (0.091)
HINDU 0.430*** 0.427*** 0.419*** 0.418*** 0.418***
(0.041) (0.045) (0.041) (0.039) (0.041)
EAST ASIAN 0.306*** 0.311*** 0.298*** 0.297*** 0.297***
(0.048) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
MALE -0.095*** -0.092 -0.092***
(0.007) (0.000) (0.007)
AGE 0.001 0.002* 0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
AGE2 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
MARRIED 0.013** 0.013** 0.014***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)








INCOME GROUP 1 0.006
(0.013)
INCOME GROUP 2 -0.007
(0.011)
INCOME GROUP 3 0.001
(0.009)
INCOME GROUP 4 0.006
(0.008)
Language families No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countries Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Waves Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.218 0.219 0.233 0.233 0.233
Mean of dependent 0.695 0.695 0.695 0.695 0.695
variable
N 148,847 148,847 148,847 148,847 148,847
Note.— Robust standard errors clustered by country and language are in
parentheses. *Denotes significance at 10 percent; **at 5 percent; ***at 1
percent levels.
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Table 3: Robustness checks — probit marginal effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable: RELIGIOUS
NO INFLECTIONAL FT 0.059** 0.067*** 0.063*** 0.052*** 0.021* 0.047*** 0.058*** 0.064***
(0.024) (0.021) (0.024) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.008)
Ethnicities No No No No No No No Yes
Denominations Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Language families Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countries Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Waves Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.242 0.297 0.270 0.263 0.224 0.214 0.218 0.250
Mean of dependent 0.692 0.669 0.689 0.704 0.744 0.720 0.737 0.694
variable
N 111,039 71,423 59,601 83,866 35,116 28,365 16,506 148,531
Note.— The sample is restricted to: individuals belonging to country-language pairs with at least
200 observations (column 1); individuals who are not speakers of one of the four global languages:
Arabic, English, Russian and Spanish (column 2); individuals who are not speakers of one of the lan-
guages of the Indo-European family (column 3); individuals outside Europe (column 4); individuals
based in geographically homogenous countries defined as those below the median of country-level
geographical ’spread’ index - please refer to the main text for definition of the index (column 5); non-
immigrants (column 6); individuals who do not speak the majority language in the country (column
7). Column (8) is based on the baseline sample definition, excluding missing values on additional
terms. Robust standard errors clustered by country and language are in parentheses. *Denotes sig-
nificance at 10 percent; **at 5 percent; ***at 1 percent levels.
of NO INFLECTIONAL FT on RELIGIOUS. Moreover, this sample restriction significantly in-
creases the estimated size of the association with the marginal effect at 6.7 percentage points.
In column (3) we furthermore explore whether the results might be driven by speakers
of Indo-European languages, while in column (4) we test the sensitivity of the results to
the presence of residents of European countries in the sample. As our estimates highlight,
neither the speakers of Indo-European languages nor the Europeans are driving the results.
Review papers by Mavisakalyan and Weber (2017) and Ginsburgh and Weber (2020) high-
light the challenges around causal identification of the effects of language. One possible
source of unobserved heterogeneity, as these studies note, is geographic characteristics of
countries. In particular, as shown by Galor et al. (2016), the absence of inflectional future
tense is positively correlated with higher crop yield and higher long-term orientation. It is
possible that the same factors also affect religiosity. By comparing behaviour of individuals
within a country, our estimation framework mitigates the confounding effects of geographic
characteristics. We are not able to control for within-country differences in geographic con-
ditions directly, but we address the associated issues indirectly, by restricting the sample
to relatively geographically-homogenous countries where there might be less variation in
the consequences of geographic and climatic characteristics, such as crop yield. We do so
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by constructing an index representing the geographical ‘spread’ of each country. Using the
maximum and minimum latitude and longitude of countries, the ‘spread’ index is calcu-
lated as the length of the vector connecting two furthest points of a country’s coordinates.
The results based on the sub-sample restricted to countries below the sample median of this
index are reported in column (5) of Table 3.7 As we see, the positive significant relation-
ship between NO INFLECTIONAL FT and RELIGIOUS is still present within this relatively
geographically-homogenous sub-sample of countries.
A significant source of linguistic diversity in our sample is likely to come from the pres-
ence of immigrants. Information on the place of birth of a respondent is not available across
all waves of the WVS. Nevertheless, we make an attempt at avoiding conflating the dif-
ferences in individuals’ languages with differences between natives and immigrants, by
dropping the immigrants from the sample at the cost of reducing the sample size to just
over 28,000 observations. In spite of this reduction in sample size, we estimate a significant
positive marginal effect on NO INFLECTIONAL FT (column (6)).8
The work of Nunziata and Rocco (2016, 2018) shows that minorities bring out “typical
traits” more strongly, because members of minorities are surrounded by a majority that is
different. In a study of the effect of religious adhesion on entrepreneurship, Nunziata and
Rocco (2016) note: “Since the individual’s degree of adhesion is not observable, we turn
to the share of residents who follow the individual’s religion. In particular, we focus on
minorities among whom we expect to find relatively large proportions of individuals with
strong attachments to their faiths, and on majorities among whom we expect to find the
opposite” (p. 205). Applied to our context of ‘linguistic adhesion’, this might imply that the
7 The countries in this sub-sample include: Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bul-
garia, Cyprus, Estonia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Hungary, Jordan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Macedonia,
Moldova, Palestine, Puerto Rico, Rwanda, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland, Trinidad and
Tobago, Uganda, Uruguay.
8 Some analyses on the link between language structures and outcomes have instead explicitly focused
on a sample of immigrants (e.g. Gay et al., 2017; Galor et al., 2020), adopting “epidemiological approach” by
comparing migrants descending from different countries within the same country of residence, in the hope
that it might help to isolate the causal effect of speaking a language (although as a recent study by Beblo et al.
(2020) suggests, studying immigrants may not overcome the concerns over causality since individuals who
select into migration are more likely to reject the norms of their country of origin and may transmit their traits
to their children). These studies, however, have used large single country datasets such as the US Census
and American Community Survey, where detailed information on the background of individuals and their
families is available. This exercise faces significant constraints within WVS where information on immigrant
background is limited, and not available (and consistently defined) across all waves. We made an attempt at
imitating a version of epidemiological approach on our dataset based on wave 3 (1994-1998) of WVS where
information on the places of birth of the respondents, defined by broad continents, is available. The estimated
marginal effect of NO INFLECTIONAL FT on RELIGIOUS in a regression which includes dummies for continent
of origin of immigrants in addition to baseline controls and host country dummies in a sample of immigrants
(N=2,405) is statistically indistinguishable from 0. The results are available on request.
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Table 4: Heterogeneity by denominational context
— probit marginal effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: RELIGIOUS
NO INFLECTIONAL FT 0.044** 0.066* 0.026** 0.017
(0.020) (0.036) (0.013) (0.037)
Denominations Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Language families Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countries Yes Yes Yes Yes
Waves Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.289 0.177 0.109 0.187
Mean of dependent 0.647 0.734 0.807 0.380
variable
N 66,885 81,958 109,840 38,983
Note.— The sample is restricted to: individuals in coun-
tries below the median of the country-level religious frac-
tionalization based on Alesina et al. (2003) (column 1); in-
dividuals in countries above the median of the country-
level religious fractionalization based on Alesina et al.
(2003) (column 2); individuals within monotheist (Chris-
tian, Muslim, Jewish) denomination groups (column 3);
individuals outside monotheist denomination groups (col-
umn 4). Robust standard errors clustered by country and
language are in parentheses. *Denotes significance at 10
percent; **at 5 percent; ***at 1 percent levels.
extent of proficiency in one’s own background language or the use of that language (both
of which bear implications for the degree of manifestation of the relevant linguistic forms)
is more prevalent among the linguistic minorities. On the other hand, according to Lazear
(1999), when a society has a very large majority of individuals from one culture, individuals
from minority groups will be assimilated more quickly. To engage with the implications of
such considerations in our context, we restrict the sample to individuals who do not speak
the majority language in the country in the regression reported in column (7) of Table 3. We
estimate a positive highly significant marginal effect on NO INFLECTIONAL FT in this sub-
sample of linguistic minorities. Given our estimation framework that achieves identification
through the presence of individuals speaking different languages within a country, we are
not able to run a regression on individuals belonging to the linguistic majority group.9
9 Also, in unreported results, we include the size of one’s own language share in the population and its in-
teraction with NO INFLECTIONAL FT as additional regressors in the baseline specification of our model. These
are not statistically significantly related to the probability of being religious. Hence, the positive statistically
significant association between NO INFLECTIONAL FT in one’s language and RELIGIOUS does not appear to
vary by the share of the population speaking the language.
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While our identification strategy, described in §3.1, accounts for many significant factors
that may affect an individual’s propensity to endorse a religion—broad geographic, institu-
tional and cultural context—it is possible that the estimated marginal effect of NO INFLEC-
TIONAL FT still reflects cultural effects related to ethnic ancestry. To deal with this possi-
bility, we directly control for ethnicity fixed effects in the final column of Table 3. Speak-
ing a language without inflectional future tense is associated with a 6.4 percentage points
increased probability of being religious in this specification with more extensive list of con-
trols.
Religiosity and religious denomination may interact in important ways as some denomi-
nations are more demanding on believers than others. We explore some of the implications
of such interactions in Table 4. In particular, it is possible that in countries with more de-
nominational choice, religiosity is higher because there is a bigger variety of options catering
for various preferences—something for every taste. On the other hand, religiosity may be
diminished in more homogenous countries where denominational choice is limited. We ex-
plore the heterogeneity in the results by the extent of religious fractionalization in a country
of residence of an individual, drawing comparisons between individuals in countries below
and above the median of the religious fractionalization distribution (source: Alesina et al.
(2003)). The estimated marginal effects of NO INFLECTIONAL FT on RELIGIOUS are posi-
tive and significant in both sub-samples (while the size of the effect is slightly higher in the
sub-sample of individuals based in relatively less fractionalized countries).
The proposed intuition behind the link between future tense and religiosity is particu-
larly applicable to monotheist religious contexts (Christianity, Islam and Judaism) where
the future rewards and penalties associated with religiosity appear to be particularly large.
Could the results be specific to monotheist religion contexts then? We address this question
by splitting the sample into two parts. First, in column (1) of Table 3 we limit the sample
to individuals in monotheist religious contexts, which comprise nearly 74% of the sample.
The estimated marginal effect on NO INFLECTIONAL FT is positive and significant. The re-
sults in column (2), on the other hand, are based on individuals in non-monotheist religion
contexts—under 39,000 observations in total. The marginal effect of NO INFLECTIONAL FT is
positive, but statistically insignificant. Hence, we restrict the remainder of the analysis that
focuses on the rewards and penalties associated with religiosity to individuals in monotheist
religious contexts.
4.2. Further implications. To motivate the connection between future tense and religios-
ity, we assume that religion offers large future incentives, both positive and negative. Both
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are hypothesized to be more effective for speakers of a language without inflectional fu-
ture tense, since they value them more and perceive them as more imminent (see §2.2 for
discussion). Is this in fact the case?
The ultimate long-term penalty associated with religion is the threat of a negative future
afterlife in hell. In the absence of information on the disutility that individuals attach to hell
in WVS, we use the responses to a question on whether they believe in hell to proxy for the
perceived threat of hell (asked in waves 3, 4, 6 of the survey). 64% of individuals in the
sample say they believe in hell.
The ultimate long-term reward, on the other hand, is a positive afterlife in heaven. While
WVS doesn’t contain information on individual valuation of heaven, it asks in waves 3 and
4 whether individuals believe in heaven or not. 76% of respondents do have such belief.
Furthermore, as we propose, there are short-term benefits to be gained from endorsing a
religion. We proxy for these by a binary variable that is based on individual responses to a
question on whether they get comfort and strength from religion (asked in waves 3 and 4).
81% of the respondents do so.
To assess whether the set of religious incentives are more effective for speakers that do
not use inflectional future-tense, we look at the propensity to respond to punishments and
rewards associated with religion for individual i in country c at time t as follows:
ReligIncentives∗ict = ζNoIn f lectFTict + Xict
′η + Kc′θ + Wt′υ + ωict (4)
Assuming ReligIncentivesict = 1(ReligIncentives∗ict ≥ 0) (where ReligIncentivesict presents
the observed responsiveness to penalties and rewards associated with religion) and normal-
ity of the error term, the probability of responding to incentives associated with religion can
be described as a probit model (with marginal effects used for interpretation).
Table 5 reports the results. First, we undertake probit estimation of BELIEF IN HELL on
NO INFLECTIONAL FT. As column (1) shows, we estimate a positive marginal effect on NO
INFLECTIONAL FT, however it is statistically insignificant.
What about the rewards from religion? Are they more effective for speakers that do not
use inflectional future-tense? The results of our probit estimation of BELIEF IN HEAVEN
on NO INFLECTIONAL FT are reported in column (2) of Table 5. The estimated marginal
effect confirms a significant and positive relationship between speaking a language without
inflectional future tense and the probability of believing in heaven. Relative to individuals
who use inflectional future tense, lack of inflectional future tense is associated with a 5.4
percentage points higher probability of believing in heaven.
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Table 5: Regressions with alternative dependent variables: incentives to en-
dorse religion — probit marginal effects
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variables:
BELIEF IN HELL BELIEF IN HEAVEN COMFORT FROM RELIGION
NO INFLECTIONAL FT 0.064 0.054** 0.034***
(0.058) (0.022) (0.011)
Denominations Yes Yes Yes
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes
Language families Yes Yes Yes
Countries Yes Yes Yes
Waves Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.209 0.239 0.216
Mean of dependent 0.703 0.812 0.874
variable
N 70,327 41,267 44,622
Note.— The sample is restricted to individuals within monotheist (Christian, Muslim, Jew-
ish) denomination groups. Robust standard errors clustered by country and language are
in parentheses. *Denotes significance at 10 percent; **at 5 percent; ***at 1 percent levels.
Not only may absence of inflectional future tense be correlated with individuals’ percep-
tion of long-term rewards associated with religion, we also surmised that it may be associ-
ated with a higher short-term pay-off from being religious (as we posit in §2.2). To assess
whether this is the case, we undertake a probit estimation of equation 4 using COMFORT
FROM RELIGION as our left-hand-side variable (column (3) of Table 5). The results are con-
sistent with our conjecture. The marginal effect of moving from a language with inflectional
future tense to a language without inflectional future tense on the probability of getting
comfort and strength from religion is positive at 3.4 percentage points. The explanation for
this may be, as we hypothesised in §2.2, that users of languages without inflectional future
tense, because of their higher concern for the future (including their own death), derive a
comparatively higher psychological pay-off from the belief in a positive afterlife.
Different religious denominations differ in the details of their respective pay-off structure.
Might this have implications for the results reported in Table 5? Engagement with the nu-
ances of the alternative reward systems of various denominations is outside the scope of our
current research. But, using a case study approach here, we draw comparisons between the
two major traditions of Christianity: Catholicism and Protestantism.10 The former stresses
good works more strongly as a factor by which one can influence God’s goodwill and hence
influence whether the afterlife will be in heaven or hell. The classical form of Protestantism,
as taught by Luther, on the other hand emphasizes God’s grace alone. While good works
are reflective of an attitude that is likely to find God’s favour, Protestants are less certain
10We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this example.
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Table 6: Regressions with alternative dependent variables: incentives to endorse religion
among Protestants and Catholics — probit marginal effects
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variables:
BELIEF IN HELL BELIEF IN HEAVEN COMFORT FROM RELIGION
Protestants Catholics Protestants Catholics Protestants Catholics
NO INFLECTIONAL FT -0.028 0.105 0.030** 0.074** 0.025** 0.066***
(0.052) (0.077) (0.015) (0.034) (0.011) (0.010)
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Language families Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countries Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Waves Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.206 0.068 0.243 0.097 0.267 0.133
Mean of dependent 0.678 0.616 0.809 0.825 0.780 0.855
variable
N 8,482 21,136 6,251 12,826 6,225 12,993
Note.— Robust standard errors clustered by country and language are in parentheses. *Denotes signifi-
cance at 10 percent; **at 5 percent; ***at 1 percent levels.
about the link between good actions and heavenly rewards. We re-estimate equation 4 sep-
arately on the sub-samples of Catholics and Protestants. The results reported in Table 6 are
consistent with these observations. In both subsamples, we find that NO INFLECTIONAL FT
is positively and statistically significantly associated with BELIEF IN HEAVEN and COMFORT
FROM RELIGION. However, the magnitudes of these relationship are larger in the Catholics’
sub-sample.
It appears that the incentives, in particular future rewards, offered by religion are more
effective for speakers of languages that lack inflectional future tense. Are they then also
more willing to take up the short-term costs associated with endorsing a religion? First,
we explore whether and how involvement in religious practices varies with the absence of
inflectional future tense in an individual’s language. To that end, we utilise information
on the frequencies of attending religious services and praying outside of religious services,
both categorised into 7 groups. While information on attendance of services is available
for all four waves of WVS used in this study, we observe information on prayers outside
of religious services in wave 3 only, which leaves us with a significantly smaller sample
size. For an average individual in the estimation sample, the frequency of attendance is at
4.3 (between attending on holidays only and once a month). The sample mean of prayer
frequency, on the other hand, is 5.9 (between once a week and more than once a week).
We characterise the relationship between lack of inflectional future tense and the fre-
quency of engagement in religious practices as follows:
ReligFrequency∗ict = µNoIn f lectFTict + Xict
′ξ + Kc′λ + Wt′σ + νict (5)
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where for an individual i in a country c at time t, ReligFrequency∗ict is the unobserved reli-
gious practice frequency. Instead of ReligFrequency∗ict, however, we can only observe cate-
gories of responses as follows:
ReligFrequencyict =

1 i f ReligFrequency∗ict 6 τ1
2 i f τ1 < ReligFrequency∗ict 6 τ2
3 i f τ2 < ReligFrequencyict∗ 6 τ3
4 i f τ3 < ReligFrequency∗ict 6 τ4
5 i f τ4 < ReligFrequency∗ict 6 τ5
6 i f τ5 < ReligFrequency∗ict 6 τ6
7 i f ReligFrequency∗ict > τ6,
(6)
where ReligFrequency is a categorically ordered frequency of religious practices that takes
values on a scale from 1 (lowest frequency) to 7 (highest frequency). τj represents the thresh-
old of switching from category j to category j+1, for j=1, 6. Hence, we apply an ordered pro-
bit model using observations in (6) to fit the parameter vector in equation (5) and calculate
marginal effects to interpret the results. These are reported in Table 7.
By construction, the marginal effect on the lowest outcome (never attends/prays) always
has the opposite sign to that of the highest outcome (attends more than once a week/daily
prayers outside religious services). There is a statistically significant effect of absence of
inflectional future tense on the frequency of individuals’ attendance to religious services
(Panel A) and on the frequency of prayers (Panel B). The estimates reported in panel A, for
example, suggest that moving from a language with inflectional future tense to a language
without an inflectional future tense decreases an individual’s propensity of never attending
a religious service by 2 percentage points, and also increases the probability of attending
religious services more than once a week by the same magnitude. Similarly, as we observe
from panel B, moving from a a language with inflectional future tense to a language without
inflectional future tense is associated with a 0.5 percentage points decrease in the probability
of never praying outside of religious services and a 5.3 percentage points increase in the
probability of daily prayers. These results are in accordance with our predictions in §2.2
regarding the higher willingness of speakers of languages without inflectional future tense
to bear the short-terms costs of being religious.
In a second step, we assess the relevance of future tense systems for an individual’s will-
ingness to take up the short-term costs associated with religiosity by looking at compliance
with norms prescribed by religions. We generate variables based on the information about
individuals’ tolerance for behaviours (we do not observe actual behaviours themselves) that























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































to questions on whether individuals consider the following behaviours as justifiable, rang-
ing from 1 (never justifiable) to 10 (always justifiable): (1) homosexuality; (2) prostitution;
(3) abortion; and (4) suicide. To ensure that the observed effects are religion-mediated, we
estimate equation 1 jointly with the following equation determining individual tolerance for
‘sinful’ behaviour:
SinToleranceict =κReligiousict + Xict′ρ + Kc′χ + Wt′π + ιict (7)
The results of estimating equations 1 and 7 simultaneously using Seemingly Unrelated Re-
gressions (SUR) are reported in Table 8.11 The coefficients of interest are β in equation 1
and κ in equation 7. Is absence of inflectional future tense associated with higher religios-
ity? And does religiosity lower the tolerance for behaviours that are construed as sins in
monotheist religions? The response to both questions across the four models we estimate
is ‘yes’. Accordingly, lack of inflectional future tense is associated with an increased com-
pliance with religious norms. Again, this is in agreement with our general prediction from
§2.2, according to which the incentives religion provides are less effective for speakers of
languages without inflectional future tense, as they discount them less and perceive them as
more imminent.
5. CONCLUSION
Religiosity matters for a range of behaviours we care about. Yet we know little about the
origins of differences in religiosity. This paper posits that future tense marking is a source
of difference in religious attitudes and behaviours. Religion wields a big carrot and a big
stick—an afterlife in heaven or an afterlife in hell. We argue that both carrot and stick are
more effective for speakers of languages without inflectional future tense, as they perceive
them as bigger and temporally closer.
We explore this prediction in a large sample of countries comparing individuals who are
identical in their observable characteristics, but differ in the grammatical structure of their
language. We confirm that relative to users of inflectional future tense, speakers who do
not use inflectional future tense are more likely to be religious and to act consistent with
religious prescriptions: attend ceremonies, pray, comply with religious norms. In an attempt
to shed light on the causes of such behaviour, we show that the rewards offered by religions,
i.e. future promise of heaven and immediate psychological comfort, hold more appeal for
speakers of languages lacking inflectional future tense.
11 SUR system is system of equations with no endogenous right-hand-side variables that allows for con-
temporaneous cross-equation error correlation. It is different from three-stage least squares which represents
a system of equations with endogenous regressors and requires instrumental variables for identification.
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If future tense should turn out to have a direct causal influence, then our results suggest
that religious preaching may be less successful in some contexts because of the grammar of
the respective language. The results contribute to several vibrant strands of literature in eco-
nomics of religion, culture, language and behaviour. Still, our analysis could be extended in
several directions in the future. While we highlight that differences in future tense explain
differences in religiosity, we do not empirically distinguish between the possible pathways
along which this may happen. The possibility that language acts as a marker of deeper cul-
tural traits is consistent with our results, as is the possibility that language affects speakers’
cognition and behavior. Further experimental work on this issue would be fruitful. Another
promising area for future research is to investigate in more detail potential differences in the
fine-grained pay-off structures of different theologies, and to examine whether there are cor-
responding variations in effect size. Differences in religiosity are large and have profound
consequences for behaviour and outcomes. Our work suggests that the cultural origins of
such differences are significant, thereby calling for more empirical work at the intersection
of economics of culture and religion.
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Dahl, Ö. and V. Velupillai (2013). The future tense. In M. S. Dryer and M. Haspelmath
(Eds.), The World Atlas of Language Structures Online. Leipzig: Max Planck Institute for
Evolutionary Anthropology.
Davis, L. and M. Reynolds (2018). Gendered language and the educational gender gap.
Economics Letters 168, 46 – 48.
Davis, L. S. and F. Abdurazokzoda (2016). Language, culture and institutions: Evidence
from a new linguistic dataset. Journal of Comparative Economics 44(3), 541 – 561.
Davis, L. S. and C. R. Williamson (2016). Culture and the regulation of entry. Journal of
Comparative Economics 44(4), 1055 – 1083.
Dehejia, R., T. DeLeire, and E. F. Luttmer (2007). Insuring consumption and happiness
through religious organizations. Journal of Public Economics 91(1), 259 – 279.
Dryer, M. S. and M. Haspelmath (Eds.) (2013). WALS Online. Leipzig: Max Planck Institute
for Evolutionary Anthropology.
Fletcher, J. and S. Kumar (2014). Religion and risky health behaviors among U.S. adolescents
and adults. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 104, 123 – 140.
Frederick, S., G. Loewenstein, and T. O’donoghue (2002). Time discounting and time pref-
erence: A critical review. Journal of Economic Literature 40(2), 351–401.
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Table A1: Regressions with alternative dependent variables: religious denom-
ination - probit marginal effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variables:
CHRISTIAN MUSLIM JEWISH HINDU EAST ASIAN OTHER
NO INFLECTIONAL FT -0.078 0.061 0.000 -0.018 0.000 0.053
(0.063) (0.417) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.066)
Baseline controls No No No No No No
Language families Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countries Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Waves Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.439 0.795 0.299 0.638 0.627 0.215
Mean of dependent 0.495 0.267 0.007 0.047 0.072 0.218
variable
N 151,056 136,051 111,530 78,839 97,653 142,539
Note.— Robust standard errors clustered by country and language are in parentheses. *De-
notes significance at 10 percent; **at 5 percent; ***at 1 percent levels.
